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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Latest Yel'tsin health ordeal 
President Yel'tsin was hospitalized last month with a large gastric ulcer, which, 
according to one of his physicians, developed extremely rapidly. (Interview with 
Sergei Mironov on NTV, 2015 GMT, 17 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-017) On Saturday, 
Yel'tsin was released from the hospital and is expected to spend two weeks 
recuperating at Barvikha Sanitarium. (UPI, 30 Jan 99; clarinet) 
 
The lessons learned from this latest hospitalization are familiar: The government 
goes on without him, but lest anyone forget he is still in some form of control, the 
threat of dismissals is lobbed at his ministers. In this particular case, the 
president evidently gave his prime minister just enough rope to hang himself by 
suggesting Primakov float a power-sharing proposal before the parliament. (For 
further information on the proposal, see "Government" section.) Once the details 
of the proposal were published, Yel'tsin quickly denounced the provisions calling 
for a suspension of his constitutional right to dissolve the Duma and called 
Primakov in for a discussion, even broadcasting part of the meeting. Speculation 
on the length of Primakov's tenure as prime minister soon occupied the press, 
despite "reassurances" from the presidential staff that Yel'tsin "has supported 
efforts taken" by Primakov. (ITAR-TASS, 1630 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
026) 
 
While it is highly unlikely that the president would sack his prime minister, 
thereby setting off another confrontation with the Duma, Yel'tsin has managed to 
remind everyone of his constitutionally given relevance. Just for the record: 
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According to Interfax (1027 GMT, 18 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-018), the Russian 
stock market has been unaffected by Yel'tsin's illness. 
 
APPARAT 
Borodin speaks up 
The extension of General Bordyuzha's authority to oversee the Kremlin's 
Economic Management Office, noted in our last digest, has provoked comment 
from Manager Pavel Borodin. The very independent-minded Borodin noted, "The 
tasks, forms and methods of our work can be changed only if over 40 
regulations, including presidential and government resolutions, are also 
changed." (Interfax, 0845 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-013) Sounds like a 
bureaucratic line in the sand. 
 
Bordyuzha rises to challenge? 
On what may or may not be a related note, General Bordyuzha announced that 
President Yel'tsin has approved the general's blueprint for the reorganization of 
the Kremlin apparat. (Interfax, 1156 GMT, 23 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-023) The 
relevant presidential decrees are expected next week. 
 
Employing a traditional Kremlin-watcher's gauge of apparat authority to 
Bordyuzha's influence with the president, it is clear that the general has been 
granted substantial access to Yel'tsin during the course of his current illness. 
Bordyuzha is frequently reported to be meeting or speaking with the president 
from the hospital. While that is not necessarily unusual for a chief of staff, it has 
been notable by its absence in the past. (As, for instance, when General 
Korzhakov was a Yel'tsin intimate.) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Primakov proposal dust-up 
The prime minister, apparently at the suggestion of the president, drafted a 
proposal on measures to foster political stability between the executive and 
 3 
legislative branches during the lead up to the next parliamentary and presidential 
elections. (ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) Drawing in 
part from a September 1998 agreement (never implemented), Primakov 
suggested that each participant agree not to employ any of its constitutional 
triggers that would lead to an early dissolution of the Duma. In exchange, the 
Duma would not proceed with attempts to remove the president. (NTV, 1900 
GMT, 25 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-025 ) 
 
Primakov did make clear that this was an overture meant to elicit responses 
which would, in turn, be sent to the president for his consideration. The president, 
as noted above, immediately renounced the restriction of his constitutional rights, 
leaving the appearance that Primakov had overreached his authority and 
consequently placed his job in jeopardy. 
 
General Bordyuzha, who in addition to being Yel'tsin's chief of staff is also a 
close associate of Primakov's, confirmed that the president had earlier solicited 
draft measures on political stability and added that the president's comments on 
the proposal were meant as input to what is still "purely a working matter." (ITAR-
TASS, 1630 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) Bordyuzha also noted that a 
Security Council session is scheduled to take up this issue. 
 
Questions raised about MinAtom finances 
The Ministry of Atomic Energy has been subjected to serious press scrutiny in 
recent months. At issue seems to be not only a re-evaluation of the March 1998 
dismissal of longtime Minister Viktor Mikhailov (and his reappearance as a 
deputy), but also the possible use of diverted ministry funds for future political 
campaigns. 
 
While the initial salvo came from Sovershenno Sekretno (11 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-331), both the Luzhkov-aligned Moskovsky komsomolets (10 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-350) and the government's Rossiyskaya gazeta (18 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
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98-362) have joined in the attack. The recent articles emphasize the shift in 
financial accounting under the current minister, Yevgeni Adamov, and the banks 
(and consequently financiers and politicians) who have benefited. One of the 
underlying assumptions of the pieces is that Adamov was appointed through the 
intervention of Boris Berezovsky, and remains "propped up" by the unlikely 
tandem of Berezovsky and Anatoli Chubais (through the electrical company YeS 
Rossii). 
 
While Adamov rejects the influence of any "oligarch" in his ministry, he does 
acknowledge that Chubais' appointment as chairman of the board of YeS Rossii 
facilitated the payment of funds for electrical energy production. (Yevgeni 
Adamov letter to the editor, Moskovsky komsomolets, 14 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
014) 
 
Adamov, in the above-referenced letter which attempts to rebut MK's charges 
about corrupt financial practices at MinAtom, suggests that his intent is to 
overhaul radically the financial arrangements at MinAtom because the real 
corruption may have occurred under his predecessor's watch: "Let us hope that 
the law enforcement authorities will not, as a matter of fact, have occasion to 
investigate the uranium business, the prerequisites for which were perfectly ripe 
on the verge of the change of leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy in 
March 1998." (Moskovsky komsomolets, 14 Jan 99) 
 
If any of this speculation is on target (and it should be noted that both the 
Moskovsky komsomolets and the Rossiyskaya gazeta articles seem to draw, in 
part, from the initial Sovershenno Sekretno piece), it would seem that Adamov's 
"revised financing" with the assistance of Chubais' new position may improve 
wage disbursement to workers, but also represents the possibility of channeling 
MinAtom resources to different political campaigns than Mikhailov may have 
supported. As to Mikhailov's affiliations, it may not be irrelevant to bear in mind 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Ivanov speaks of Russian-US equality; Albright gives reassurances 
Referring to a telephone conversation between President Boris Yel'tsin and 
visiting US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
told journalists on 26 January that "it is of principled importance that they 
confirmed the allegiance of Russia and the United States to the development of 
bilateral relations on the basis of equality [and] respect for each other's interests." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1258 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) 
 
This statement followed Albright's earlier statements which were designed to 
reassure the Russian government that a decision on deploying a new US Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) system would not be made any earlier than mid-1999. 
During a joint news conference held with her Russian counterpart, Foreign 
Minister Ivanov, Albright stressed the US commitment to the ABM Treaty but at 
the same time noted there are new threats in the world which the two countries 
should take into account. Albright stated that the US budget has money for 
research and development now but added that, if it is necessary to deploy a new 
ABM system, this will be done no sooner than the year 2005. (ITAR-TASS, 1258 
GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) While Albright was reassuring the Russian 
government that the US would not move forward on a new ABM system without 
Russian knowledge, if not approval, Ivanov was reassuring the Russian press 
that Russia was a strong independent state. Responding to a question 
concerning economic assistance in exchange for political assurances, Ivanov 
said "we do not bargain with our national interests." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
1250 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) 
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However, bargains may have been on Secretary Albright's agenda as she voiced 
support for the Russian free press and offered $10 million to strengthen free 
press in Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1614 GMT, 25 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-025) 
Perhaps the ratification of START-II is what the US can expect in return for its 
support of the Russian free press. While speaking at a joint press conference 
Albright expressed the hope that the START-II Treaty will be ratified when she 
comes to Moscow next time and that work on START-III will begin. (ITAR-TASS, 
2055 GMT, 26 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-026) 
 
The Russian media depicted Secretary Albright's visit to Moscow as a Russian 
diplomatic victory. The Russian coverage emphasized American reassurances 
on the ABM treaty, the pledges of economic support, and the theme of US-
Russian equality. Although Foreign Minister Ivanov did give some assurances 
concerning a Russian crackdown on weapons technology exports, these were 
overshadowed by the Russian government's and scientific community's repeated 
denials of having assisted Iran with any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
 
Where in the world is Abdullah Ocalan now? Not in Italy 
Once again the Russian government played a game of diplomatic cat and mouse 
with Turkey and the international community over the whereabouts of Abdullah 
Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party. On 19 January 1999 Russia's 
Federal Security Service (FSB) and foreign ministry declined to comment on the 
Turkish authorities' assertions that Abdullah Ocalan had returned to Russia 
following his short hiatus in Italy. In conjunction with this official "no comment," 
sources in the Russian foreign ministry told Interfax on 19 January that, 
according to Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, "competent services are checking 
reports that Ocalan has flown out to South Africa from Moscow." (Interfax, 1257 
GMT, 19 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) The comments are reminiscent of 
statements made during Ocalan's short period of "exile" in Moscow after his 
expulsion from Syria in late 1998. Following what was most certainly an 
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exhaustive search on 22 January, Colonel-General Valentin Sobolev, first deputy 
chief of the Federal Security Service, declared that "the Leader of the Workers 
Party of Kurdistan [PKK] is not in Russian territory today." Sobolev stated that, 
"we have taken all measures to look for him after requests have reached us from 
authorities in Turkey and Italy. The result was negative." Also on the same day 
Ivanov told a news conference, "I can state officially that Abdullah Ocalan is not 
in Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 0948 GMT, 22 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-022) 
 
Although Moscow has apparently closed the latest chapter in the Ocalan affair 
with its official "search and denial" mission, only time or the Turkish security 
services will reveal the actual whereabouts of Ocalan. Moscow, which has long 
been accused of supporting the Kurdish rebels and still permits a Kurdish 
mission that represents the PKK to remain in the city, has not completely turned 
its back on Ocalan. 
 
Issa Magomedov, the head of the department for international law at the Russian 
Prosecutor-General's Office, left the door open for Ocalan's return to Russia by 
stating that "if Ocalan is found in Russia, Moscow will have no legal reasons for 
extraditing the leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party to Turkey." He said Russia 
and Turkey have not signed an agreement on the mutual extradition of criminals 
on the basis of which individuals suspected of committing crimes may be 
deported. (Interfax, 1257 GMT, 19 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) 
 
Russian and French ministers cozy up in Moscow 
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine recently concluded what appeared to be 
more a mutual admiration mission than a substantive foreign ministry visit to 
Moscow in early January. Official statements issued by both the Russian prime 
minister and French foreign minister focused exclusively on the "very similar 
positions, converging objectives, and complementary approaches" the two 
countries share. At the beginning of a 12 January meeting with the French 
foreign minister, Primakov told Vedrine, "you have an absolutely correct 
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understanding of the current developments in Russia," and "it inspires me to hear 
you say that our model is close to European Social Democracy." (Interfax, 0911 
GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-012) Although Primakov took the opportunity to 
highlight how much the French government admired the Russian political model, 
the majority of the meetings focused on international issues with which Moscow 
and Paris share a common point of view. During a meeting with Vedrine on 12 
January, Primakov noted that "our countries have very close positions on 
international affairs," and "we understand well that measures need to be taken to 
maintain order to stabilize the international situation." (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 0822 GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-012) Vedrine echoed this same 
theme but was more specific, stating that France and Russia have "very similar 
positions, converging objectives, and complementary approaches" to Iraq and 
Kosovo. Vedrine stated that "we are going to submit to our Security Council 
partners some ideas for getting out of the current situation [in Iraq] and 
redirecting the UN inspection methods." (AFP (Domestic Service), 12 Jan 99; 
FBIS-WEU-99-012) 
 
Russia and France have long maintained similar positions on several 
international issues, not least of which have been UN sanctions and inspections 
in Iraq. Vedrine's statement concerning the "redirecting" of UN inspection 
methods coincided with several Russian statements concerning the obsolete 
nature of UNSCOM and the need to overhaul the UN inspection team that was 
operating in Iraq prior to Operation Desert Fox. Vedrine's statements fall short of 
complete French support for a Russian initiative to overhaul the UNSCOM team; 
however, based on French actions in the Security Council, it would not be 
surprising to see a joint Russian-French proposal for a revamped Iraqi-friendly 
UNSCOM team. 
 
Let the 'sunshine' in 
South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young has expressed his country's 
backing of the Russian-proposed six-way talks on the Korean peninsula. Russian 
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Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov responded by supporting ROK engagement effort on 
the issue, which has been termed the "sunshine policy." (Yonhap, 0055 GMT, 26 
Jan 99; FBIS-EAS-99-025) This comes on the heels of revealing Japanese 
analysis -- apparently aided by US intelligence -- that "Nodong missiles have 
either already been deployed or are being installed at over 10 bases in North 
Korea. " Although the report has yet to be confirmed, deployment of such a highly 
mobile arsenal would only increase the security threat to both Japan and the 
ROK. 
 
3,000 North Koreans labor in Siberia while 200 Chinese are repatriated 
KOTRA, the Korean Trade Investment Promotion Agency, has revealed that over 
30 percent of Siberia's foreign workers are North Koreans. The DPRK reportedly 
receives over $10 million in foreign currency annually from these workers alone. 
The workers are being sent to Siberia to work on agricultural and construction 
projects. (Hangyore, 0903 GMT, 19 Jan 99; FBIS-EAS-99-023) Meanwhile, 
according to a recent report from the Trans-Baikal regional department press 
service, 200 Chinese nationals residing illegally on Russian territory were 
repatriated from "Operation Vikhr-3" at the end of December. It was noted that 
while the Chinese were apparently not taking part in illegal activity, their 
presence on Russian soil was in itself an illegal act. Now that the Sino-Russian 
demarcation effort has been successfully completed, the effort to repatriate 
Chinese workers has been stepped up. (TASS, 0714 GMT, 6 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-
99-006) 
 
Russo-Japanese demarcation effort stalls 
According to Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, "it's a fact that there 
are wide differences and the [demarcation] talks have stalled." (Kyodo, 0355 
GMT, 22 Jan 99; FBIS-EAS-99-21) The talks were held under auspices of the 
new commissions founded in the November 1998 Moscow Declaration. The 
commissions were to handle joint economic development and demarcation of the 
disputed Kurile Islands chain. It was hoped that the commission could resolve the 
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territory issue so that the peace treaty negotiations could be concluded by the 
year 2000. This latest setback brings the target date even further into doubt. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Orsk mayor discusses consequences of regional protectionism 
Nikolai Tarasov, mayor of the city of Orsk in the Orenburg Region, discussed the 
"war" presently underway among the 89 regions of the Russian Federation. In 
response to the economic and political crisis of August 1998, many regions 
banned exports, and in some cases imports, of products from other regions. The 
intention was to prevent shortages, but the result has been a glut in the exporting 
region and, in the absence of alternative suppliers, a severe shortage in the 
formerly importing region. There are now instances of smuggling, and in the case 
of Orenburg and neighboring Bashkortostan, this has meant the smuggling of 
milk. According to Tarasov, the governor of Orenburg Region has spoken to the 
president of Bashkortostan and now some milk "trickles" into Orenburg where it 
used to "stream." 
 
Regional protectionism may be politically popular, and even intuitively 
responsible in the short run, but as with the leaders of Orsk and Bashkortostan, 
policy makers may now be understanding that protectionism is ultimately in no 
one's interest, especially within the same country. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 
Weekend Edition, 6 Jan 99, p. 13; FBIS-SOV-99-007) 
 
Vladivostok municipal election saga continues 
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Vladivostok remains the only city in the Russian Federation not to have had a 
democratically elected city council or city charter since the dissolution of the 
soviets in 1993. Each time an election has been planned, it has been cancelled 
or prevented in some way. Hopes were high that this would finally end with the 
17 January 1999 elections. 
 
The most recent phase of the saga began when President Yel'tsin issued a 
decree in December removing Viktor Cherepkov as mayor, while asking the 
Primorye Kray's governor, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, to nominate an acting mayor 
until elections could be held. Nazdratenko nominated Yuri Kopylov, Cherepkov's 
former deputy mayor, who had been similarly removed from office by the court.  
 
Cherepkov refused to relinquish his office physically or officially, claiming 
Yel'tsin's move was unconstitutional, and has filed a complaint with the Russian 
Constitutional Court. The court has agreed to hear the case on 14 February. 
 
The result was a peculiar scene where Vladivostok had two mayors, each 
demanding loyalty from the city and its citizens. Cherepkov and his supporters 
holed up in the mayor's office, known as the Grey House, while Kopylov set up 
shop in the district administration building known as the Yellow House down the 
street. Kopylov threatened to send in the police to remove Cherepkov, but had to 
contend with Cherepkov's supporters surrounding the building. 
 
The solution was hoped to have been the 17 January 1999 elections for the 22 
seats on the city council. The council had the tasks of passing a charter for the 
city and appointing a mayor from their ranks under the conditions of the new 
charter. For the first time the people of the city would have had a democratically 
elected city council and city charter. But like every other attempt in the last six 
years, this was not to be. 
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Initially, 16 of the 22 district elections were deemed to be valid. The other six 
were ruled invalid due to low voter turnout and new elections were slated to be 
held between 17 March and 17 May. Cherepkov and his supporters won 15 of 
the 16 valid seats, and as 15 members present constituted a quorum, the council 
met on 23 January, ratified the city charter and elected Cherepkov mayor of 
Vladivostok. His temporary replacement, Kopylov, did not run. 
 
Initially all seemed well until the city election commission declaired that only 10 of 
the 22 seats were valid, and later revised that number down to nine. The city 
council's adoption of the city charter and its appointment of Cherepkov as mayor 
were therefore invalidated. The local court also dissolved the council, although it 
is not clear what the purpose was, given that the council, lacking a quorum, could 
not pass legislation anyway. 
 
Within all of this must be seen the never-ending battle between Nazdratenko and 
Cherepkov. The courts, the election commissions, parties, and even the Kremlin, 
are all used to further one side over the other. The fact that Yel'tsin personally 
asked the Central Election Commission to oversee this election, and the fact that 
it was unable to prevent the present debacle shows just how weak the center can 
be when intense regional interests are involved. 
 
The next step, for the umpteenth time, is to hold elections in those city council 
districts in which elections were invalidated. Perhaps the wisest step would be to 
keep the local and federal election commissions out of the picture by bringing in 
election officials from other, noncontiguous regions, who could be given the sole 
power of conducting the elections. And if more faith in the process were needed, 
perhaps the results of the elections could be validated by a second group of 
regional election officials. What does seem to be needed is some electoral 
monitoring system which is reasonably above reproach and is truly interested in 
the integrity of the process. While the outcome of elections is that which 
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ultimately decides the future of the country's citizens, it is belief in the fairness of 
the process of democracy which gives the outcome its legitimacy. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Michael Reardon and LCDR Fred Dummond 
 
Recently completed reorganization produces miraculous results! 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, Col. Gen. Anatoly Kornukov, 
recently proclaimed the merger of Russia's military air force and air defense 
forces has been completed. He said, "The new structure of the Air Force will 
allow the combat capacity of various air troops to be used under single 
command." (Interfax, 0906 GMT, 8 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-008) The CINC then 
provided some insights into the need for the new organizational structure. In an 
interview with Interfax he said that, in the initial stages of combat actions, the use 
of aircraft should precede the use of land forces and the air force has the 
responsibility for successful implementation. According to Kornukov, "The Air 
Force of today, with its highly mobile, multi-purpose efficient means of defense 
and attack, ensure[s] the defense of the country in the sky. This increases the 
part the Air Force plays in contemporary military conflicts. This increased role 
calls for a radical revision of military tactics and practice and the ways of 
developing the armed forces." (Interfax, 0906 GMT, 8 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-008) 
 
Though complete, the merger is apparently not the last step; the air force CINC 
told reporters three days later that one of the chief tasks of Russia's air force in 
1999 will be to perfect the structure of the force. (ITAR-TASS, 1315 GMT, 11 Jan 
99; FBIS-SOC-99-011) Other chief tasks will be to enhance combat readiness 
and develop armaments and equipment, a difficult task under the tight fiscal 
constraints facing all the Russian armed forces. Kornukov stated there will be an 
emphasis on multifunctional systems in the air force armaments and equipment, 
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with the new S-400 anti-aircraft system (follow-on enhancement of the S-300 
system) adopted for service. The S-400 will have priority for the next 20-50 
years. This "priority" must be Kornukov's own or only a priority within the air 
force, because most other high officials, including Defense Minister Igor Sergeev 
and Deputy Premier Maslyukov, clearly favor upgrading Russia's strategic 
arsenal with as many SS-28s as the budget will allow. The CINC provided 
modernization plans for the Su-24, Su-25, and Su-27, and said the range of the 
MiG-31 fighter will be increased, with its armaments perfected. (ITAR-TASS, 
1315 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-011) 
 
For the remainder of the interview, Col. Gen. Kornukov spouted numbers and 
statistics positive to his service with the flare and confidence of a seasoned 
politician. For example, a numerical strength of 193,000 on 1 January 99 
compared to 318,000 a year ago, 580 units disbanded, over 41,000 servicemen 
discharged, including 69 generals [of course, he didn't mention how many may 
have been added as a result of the president's edict to promote 100 additional 
officers to the rank of general (See Editorial Digest, Vol. IV, No. 1)], and 32 
airfields and 310 cantonments vacated as a result of reform. The CINC also said 
the air force in now manned at 99 percent as a result of "organizational 
operations," compared to the previous level of 75 percent. 
 
Probably the most interesting statistic is that, presumably due to reform, the 
aircraft fleet is now magically 70 to 85 percent "ready for flight[s]," compared to 
30 to 40 percent before reform. (ITAR-TASS, 1315 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-
99-011) However, the increase in flight readiness should be no surprise, as the 
air force was blessed with an overabundance of funds in 1998, a whopping 5.5 
billion rubles allocated versus the 13.5 billion rubles required. (ITAR-TASS, 1315 
GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-011) Of course, the most logical explanations for 
the miraculous increase in operability rate are that either the general just decided 
not to count broken aircraft or that those 60 to 70 percent of the fleet previously 
considered unable to fly have been simply redesignated as static displays. 
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... But 'complete' may be a relative term 
Air Force Commander-in-Chief Col. Gen. Anatoly Kornukov's recent proclamation 
that the merger of Russia's military air force and air defense forces has been 
completed may be a momentary condition if the strategic missile troops 
commander or defense minister have anything to say. The possibility of another 
reshuffle in the air force has been hinted at for months. Even before Kornukov 
reported that the air force-air defense force merger was 95 percent complete six 
months ago (ITAR-TASS, 1708 GMT, 11 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182), Strategic 
Missile Troops CINC Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev was beginning to make a play 
for Kornukov's new empire. Yakovlev suggested that the missile troops and air 
force should be combined into a single service, allowing for additional savings 
over the almost 20 percent realized by the current air force-air defense merger. 
He believes the new service could be in place by 2003. (See Editorial Digest, 
Vol. III, No. 12) There is little doubt who he saw leading this "new and improved" 
force structure. 
 
Though Yakovlev's idea for an "air and space" merger may have fallen off the 
scope for the time being, another even more controversial one has bubbled to 
the surface -- and continued to boil. Two months ago, Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev reported that President Yel'tsin had agreed to a proposal to combine all 
strategic assets under one command. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 16) 
Under the proposal, strategic forces of the air force, navy and missile forces 
would be consolidated into a Strategic Deterrent Force. This force would serve 
under a single Unified High Command instead of the General Staff. Not 
surprisingly, this revelation irked more than just air force officials. Navy and air 
force chiefs saw their empires, already suffering from reform cuts, crumbling 
further. Also, the General Staff's authority would be greatly reduced by not having 
the nuclear stick under its direction. Considering all the opposition, coupled with 
President Yel'tsin's failing health and diminished political clout, it seemed as if the 
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defense minister's new organizational design was destined for the archives even 
before it got off the drawing board. 
 
However, it may be premature to close the books on this one yet. After two 
months of relative silence, Sergeev provided a strong indication that he has not 
given in to pressure from the opposition. Speaking to a group of Russian military 
journalists on 13 January, Sergeev said that the combined main command of 
strategic containment forces will be created in 1999. "If we do not create a more 
perfect combat control system, our missiles, no matter how many of them we 
have, will be decorative." (ITAR-TASS, 1814 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
014) He reiterated that the combined main command of strategic containment 
forces will incorporate Strategic Rocket Forces and the nuclear components of 
the air force and navy. The defense minister noted that the combat control 
system should be able to respond promptly to changes in the situation, "be 
viable," and act under any circumstances. (ITAR-TASS, 1814 GMT, 13 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-014) The portion of his comments which raises the greatest 
expectation for actual realization of the new structure is that Sergeev said it 
would be created this year and not some time off in the next decade or at some 
undisclosed time in the future. 
 
The most disturbing aspect of this proposal may be the opportunity to consolidate 
funding for nuclear assets. Russia's financial woes are well (and often) 
documented. Underfunding of the military continues to be severe, with each of 
the services having to make many tough decisions on how to spread the few 
rubles they do receive. Much has been reported on Sergeev's and Deputy 
Premier Maslyukov's desire to produce Topol-M missiles at an overly ambitious 
production rate. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 16) Separating the nuclear 
forces from the navy and the air force would also separate the funding. Any 
arguments for equitable distribution of strategic and conventional funding from 
General Staff officials would fall on deaf ears, as presumably the funding chain 
for the Strategic Deterrent Forces would be through the newly established 
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Unified High Command. With the "You better listen to us because we're still a 
powerful nuclear force to be reckoned with" defense advocated by Russian 
Federation officials every time the US or British do or say something contrary to 
their liking, it is pretty clear where their emphasis lies. The ultimate result would 
be a navy with more ships rotting under the surface than above; an untrained, 
underfed army forced to beg on the streets; a grounded, obsolete air force; and, 
most importantly, more highly capable nuclear ballistic missiles in the hands of 
fewer dangerous men. 
 
And now it's time for 'Meet the Republic' with Igor Sergeev 
Even Dale Carnegie would have been proud of Russian Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev for his comments to Russian military journalists in connection with 
Russian Press Day, 13 January. During the gathering, Sergeev provided the 
press with details of several aspects of upcoming military reform initiatives. In 
addition to the establishment of a Strategic Deterrent Force, discussed above, 
Sergeev named the creation of permanent-readiness units, their interoperability, 
the modernization of their weapons and hardware, and their adequate funding as 
key reform initiatives. (ITAR-TASS, 1814 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-014) 
He also said that work will continue on reducing the number of military districts 
and their reorganization into six operational and strategic commands, with the 
Volga and Ural military districts consolidated in 1999. (ITAR-TASS, 1814 GMT, 
13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-014) 
 
Then, the defense minister switched gears. He told the crowd that the "press is 
the drive belt of military reform, it is a mechanism which can keep the public 
informed about what the defense minister does and why he does it." Sergeev 
said that it is his duty to explain his actions to Russian taxpayers. Continuing, he 
stated, "An open society cannot be built without open press." The defense 
minister stressed, "I always read critical articles attentively. I am perhaps the first 
defense minister who writes resolutions on media reports." Sergeev also noted 
that "it is impossible to carry out military reform without information support." 
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(ITAR-TASS, 1731 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-014) Why did Sergeev make 
these comments? Maybe it was because he wasn't feeling much love from his 
generals due to his recent reform initiatives. Or maybe he felt he needed the 
press on his side to sell his ideas to the world. Whatever the reasons, I am sure 
Sergeev's comments brought tears to the eyes of everyone in the audience. 
Tears of pride ... or those tears you get when you've laughed uncontrollably for a 
long time. 
 
Wanted: S-300 deployment location, tourist-free and no Marines 
The $500 million Russia-Cypriot deal to send Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft 
missile defense systems to Cyprus encountered a major obstacle last month 
when Cypriot Republic President Glavkos Kliridhis announced the S-300s would 
not be deployed to Cyprus as previously planned. At the time, Crete was 
announced as the alternate location. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 18) 
However, cloud over the deal has become as thick as London fog. According to 
Interfax, "This decision [to deploy the systems on Crete] stirred protests on the 
island, which attracts a lot of tourists." There is also a US Marine base situated 
on the island. In an apparent revelation Interfax reported, "Furthermore, 
stationing the complexes in Crete will not ensure security of Cyprus, say 
experts." (Interfax, 1012 GMT, 15 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-015) Experts? Using not 
much more than a map, a ruler, and rudimentary knowledge of the S-300's 
capabilities, any teenager could have figured out that one. So stay tuned, the 
search continues for a suitable S-300 deployment location. 
 
My plane's better than your plane 
The long-awaited public debut of the MiG fifth generation fighter aircraft took 
place on 12 January. Referred to in the West as the "MiG 1.42" (from the 
Mikoyan Design Bureau's Project 1-42), the Russians are calling it the "MFI" 
(from the Russian initials for multipurpose combat fighter). Russian print and TV 
media are lauding the development of this latest MiG fighter as proof of the 
viability and even superiority of Russian aviation design and ingenuity. While the 
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public unveiling of this aircraft is noteworthy, Russian press reports and the 
attendant sniping on the MiG have been particularly entertaining. 
 
Before delving into what the Russians are saying about the new aircraft, here are 
some general notes. The aircraft shown is a prototype model, built in 1991 but 
essentially stored until now, due to lack of funding for development. It has not 
flown yet; that event may happen in February. From the few pictures released so 
far, it does not appear to break new design ground, sharing many characteristics 
with the French Rafale and the consortium-built Eurofighter. These include 
shaping for some stealth capability, canard foreplanes, and a large intake located 
on the underside of the aircraft. As with the US F-22, the MiG has twin-engines 
and twin-tails. A competing Russian aircraft from the Sukhoi Design Bureau, the 
S-37 Berkut, has a much more unconventional appearance, with forward-swept 
wings. 
 
The first Russian press reports on Project 1-42 started off in a fairly 
straightforward manner, with the claims of the "new" aircraft's capabilities 
increasing over time. In all the reports there was an understandable air of pride 
noticeable. NTV broadcast a few brief reports on debut day, with its reporters 
interviewing and quoting from the MiG bureau's designers. NTV reported that the 
MiG would "not be inferior to the F-22," and would cost much less, but noted also 
that the plane had "a rather uncertain future" due to Russia's financial state. NTV 
stated that the aircraft's design was begun 15 years ago, and "a few" prototypes 
exist. A subsequent broadcast began the stream of hyberbole, promoting the 
superiority of the Russian design (including swipes at US stealth aircraft). The 
general manager (or director general -- the person is referred to by various titles) 
of the MiG aircraft works claimed that the aircraft is impossible to track in 
subsonic or supersonic flight, helped in part because all planned weapons are to 
be carried internally. (External weapons and other unnecessary protrubences 
increase an aircraft's radar return. The prototype had underwing stores stations, 
though.) The general manager was sure, according to NTV, that the MiG is "less 
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visible than the US Stealth fighter, which was not invisible to Soviet air defense 
facilities long before it went into service. Russian designers have taken into 
consideration the mistakes made by the Americans and have achieved less 
visibility at a lower price." (NTV, 1100 GMT and 1600 GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-
SOV-99-012) 
 
Apparently not all of the Russian press was taking the design bureau's claims for 
its latest combat aircraft at face value. Moskovskiye novosti called the MiG 1-42 
presentation a hoax. The newspaper alleged that an old design, designated 1-44, 
was shown instead of the actual Project 1-42, in part to obtain money from the 
government. A military analyst from the paper repeated these charges on Russia 
TV, giving the story a wider audience. (BBC, 20 Jan 99) 
 
Rossiyskaya gazeta quickly countered with a blustery rebuttal. It featured 
comments by MiG's general manager, made at an ITAR-TASS press conference. 
Here are a few revealing excerpts: "Then there was World War II, and it turned 
out that the best airplanes were built in the United States, the USSR, and 
Germany.... In spite of all their genius and financial power, the Germans have for 
some reason gotten out of the habit of designing and making good submarines, 
tanks, fighters, bombers.... The Americans spent billions of dollars to achieve the 
effect of invisibility. Ultimately they have built all kinds of 'flying saucers,' which 
are easier to shoot down than the antediluvian German Junkers. It is simply that 
no one has ever really tried to shoot them down." 
 
Then we get to the point of the history lessons: "So, the MFI (Russian!) embodies 
two technologies at once, making it really invisible to radar. And it turns out that 
no fancy shape, no frightening colors are needed. Everything is simple and 
wonderful in a Russian way. When they figured that out, the Yanks started 
kicking themselves." The article continues on in a similar manner, where 
proponents of the MiG assail those Russian journalists who denigrate Russian 
achievements and innovations. 
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ITAR-TASS followed up on its own with a report that "leading experts" in Russian 
aviation sent an open letter to Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov complaining of 
publications critical to their industry. According to Tass, the experts think that 
such comments should "not be left unattended." "Wildcat" strikes at MiG facilities, 
in protest of these same critical comments, were also mentioned. (ITAR-TASS, 
1500 GMT, 21 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-022) 
 
Obshchaya gazeta reported much the same in regards to the MFI, and from the 
tone of its article is right in tow with the "party" line. It did quote a Russian 
general on his view of the future of this aircraft: "The new fighter has a good 
chance of becoming the aircraft of the 22d century. At least that is what will 
happen if the project continues to be financed in the manner it has to date." The 
newspaper was not amused by the good general's remarks. (Obshchaya gazeta, 
14-20 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-025) 
 
And now for the rest of the story. Any introduction of a major Russian weapons 
system is a newsworthy event, not to be belittled. However, one must not make 
too much of the introduction of a prototype, and not pay too much attention to 
unproven claims for an as yet unflown aircraft. Coupled with some rather off-the-
wall remarks concerning foreign systems, it's hard to take the cheerleaders of the 
MiG MFI all that seriously, and apparently many in the West are not doing so: 
The more outlandish statements cited above have not reappeared in Aviation 
Week, for example. It is obvious that the Russian aviation industry, along with the 
Russian defense ministry, is trying hard to make a case for funding development 
of the MiG, hoping that it may be building a military justification for buying 
production versions, while at the same time promoting the Russian aviation 
industry. After all, it was in weapons systems that the USSR was able to compete 
effectively with the US and the West. The case really remains the same with 
Russia today -- broadly speaking, it is the only area of industry that has 
competitive products to sell on the world market. 
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A problem arises when not all Russians believe the sales pitches, and horror of 
horrors, are able to publish their views in the press. Think of the audacity of some 
Russians to point out the "bluff" of the new MiG, by reminding its readers that 
"hey, this is just one, unflown, unproven prototype on display here." To that may 
we humbly add some counters to the statements made in the various dispatches. 
To begin with, Project 1-42 is an old design. If it is true that design work on it 
started 15 years ago, around 1984, it is highly doubtful that the MiG is 
significantly more stealthy than, or even on par with, the US F-22, F-117 or B-2. 
Without actual flight testing, comments on the superiority of the MiG's design are 
at best premature. Just ask the folks who built the B-2, an aircraft that, despite its 
elegant design, needed some fine-tuning and tweaking to achieve its desired 
level of operational stealthiness. 
 
Statements on US aircraft being "flying saucers" and not being shot down 
because no one really tried are plain silly, even by bombastic Russian standards. 
Maybe the Russians forgot that it was primarily Soviet-made missile systems that 
were trying, unsuccessfully, to shoot down F-117s in Iraq back in 1991. And 
finally, maybe the MiG folks should stick to critiquing only aircraft designs; for 
instance, the German Type 209 diesel submarine is not a threat to be dismissed 
lightly. 
 
Development of the MFI will of course be watched closely in the West. Previous 
generations of Russian, primarily MiG, fighters have proven to be capable 
warfighting machines. The MiG 29, though not without some limitations, could be 
a worthy adversary if flown by competent pilots. Sukhoi's Su-27 (and variants) is 
a remarkable fighter. What has always been interesting is seeing the Russian 
approach to design -- they have taken different and at times ingenious 
approaches to the task. We'll be waiting for the press reports that may be 
forthcoming from the flight testing of Project 1-42. In the meantime, we'll just 
enjoy the entertainment factor provided by the aircraft's supporters. 
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All together now 
On the one hand, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev called the Russian press the 
"drive belt of military reform," adding further that "An open society cannot be built 
without open press." His comments were made at a gathering celebrating 
Russian Press Day. (ITAR-TASS, 1731 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-014) 
This was before the questioning article on the MiG MFI appeared. On the other 
hand there is a "movement in support of the army and the defense industry" that 
wishes to "draft regulations to set up a public tribunal to accuse the mass media 
of not providing objective coverage of the army topic." (Radiostantsiya Ekho 
Moskvy, 1030 GMT, 16 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-016) This of course would be done 
within the framework of the constitution; the group only wants to change it, not 
oppose it. An open press serves the country much better when it is not too free. 
 
What a strange new world we're living in 
Life in the new world order certainly has turned topsy-turvy compared to life in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For instance, who back then could have 
imagined Swedish, much less Lithuanian, authorities monitoring Russian military 
presence in Kaliningrad? Swedish military personnel visited various Russian 
military elements in Kaliningrad in support of the Vienna Treaty, signed by 55 
countries, "for security- and confidence-building measures in Europe." The initial 
report from the Swedes was that they were happy with the Russian compliance. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1805 GMT, 14 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-014) Lithuanian inspectors 
followed a few days later for the same purpose. Tass noted the historic aspect of 
the Baltic Fleet visit, and remarked that "Russian military experts have not 
inspected the Lithuanian Armed Forces so far." (ITAR-TASS, 1232 GMT, 18 Jan 
99; FBIS-SOV-99-018) 
 
After the West spent billions of dollars over the decades in the Cold War against 
the USSR, the European Union will spend four million euros over two years to 
help retrain former officers of the Russian armed forces. (ITAR-TASS, 1952 
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GMT, 15 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-015) Targeted officers are those awaiting 
discharge as well as those already released from duty. Several Russian 
ministries will cooperate in the running of this program, with the focus on 
servicemen receiving "help in job-finding at defense-related enterprises, currently 
in the process of conversion, as well as at small and medium-scale businesses." 
The number of expected trainees was not revealed. (ITAR-TASS, 1952 GMT, 15 
Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-015) 
 
The final note in this theme is a proposed Russian-Israeli cooperative effort in 
upgrading earlier generation MiG aircraft. The MiG director general observed that 
around 5,000 MiG-21 aircraft are still active worldwide, that this was a "huge 
market," and that "MiG should team up with Israeli companies 'in the markets of 
countries where we (Russia) have lost our influence.'" Israeli companies have 
already worked on upgrading Romanian MiGs but were not "very successful ... 
on their own." (Interfax, 1257 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-013) There is some 
irony in this as the MiG 21 was the most popular aircraft type employed by 
Israel's immediate neighbors. But then, the Israelis are very familiar with the 
plane. 
 
Update on the Minsk 
In October we reported on the former Russian aircraft carrier, the Minsk, being 
sold as scrap to China. One allegation made at that time was that the ship still 
had some of its weapons systems intact, calling into question the veracity of the 
scrap metal story. (Editorial Digest, 7 Oct 98) The Washington Post recently 
wrote that the ship really is intended to be a floating amusement park, complete 
with a hotel. (Washington Post, 25 Jan 99) This harkens back to an ABC News 
report from July 1998 which floated the story that the Minsk was going to be an 
amusement center in Macao. Apparently port authorities there did not like the 
idea of the ship in their harbor. The Post updated the Macao link: Instead of the 
Minsk, a larger, ex-Ukranian (ex-Soviet) aircraft carrier the Varyag, will become 
the amusement platform there. Now, in either case, if any weapons systems still 
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remain intact, these floating fun palaces may add unmatched realism to their 
combat action video games. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Collective security or just big brother? 
Five out of eight CIS member states' security council secretaries voted to extend 
the Collective Security Treaty at a meeting of the CIS Working Group meeting in 
Moscow. (TASS, 1653 GMT, 19 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan attended the 
closed-door meeting held in the presidential office. (TASS, 1439 GMT, 19 Jan 
99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) However, the Georgian secretary revealed that 
differences remain concerning whether to extend the treaty until modifications 
can be made, or simply to adapt the treaty to "contemporary conditions" before 
prolonging it. Either way, the future for a CIS Collective Security Treaty looks 
strong. Accordingly, the press release on the results of the meeting stressed the 
importance of the treaty as a deterrent to "across-the-border terrorism, illegal 
narcotics traffic, arms contraband, and organized crime," as well as a means of 
"ensuring nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction." In support of joint 
measures, Chief of CIS Military Cooperation Viktor Prudnikov has advocated the 
establishment of a CIS-wide unified defense system, including missile warning 
systems, space control, and intelligence collection. Thus far, work has focused 
on developing an anti-aircraft system, the plans of which were Russian-led. 
(Interfax, 1040 GMT, 15 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-015) Prudnikov's comments 
appear to have been prompted by "several states...[who] prefer the language of 
force" in reference to recent US actions in Iraq. 
 
Big brother Boris tries again 
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CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky said that Russia has "a colossal 
influence" on the former republics, but stressed that artificially promoting the 
integration process "is the most dangerous, as it immediately reminds of the past, 
of the domination, of the division between the elder and the younger brother." 
(TASS, 1147 GMT, 17 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-017) This has not deterred 
Berezovsky's personal attempts to dominate the CIS integration process. 
However, CIS collective measures will not include Berezovsky's most recent 
proposal. The proposal, called a "personal KGB" by his opponents, would 
establish an "anti-terrorist" and "counterintelligence" center in direct control of the 
executive secretariat. (Monitor, 22 Jan 99) This is not the first time that 
Berezovsky has attempted to create a stronger power base for the Secretariat. 
(See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 18) In his previous plan, Berezovsky 
envisioned a CIS-wide free-trade area and the institution of a single coordinating 




Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Treaty? What treaty? 
On 25 December 1998, President Leonid Kuchma proclaimed "a new chapter" in 
Russian-Ukrainian relations, after the Russian Duma ratified the Russian-
Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, known as the 
"Friendship Treaty." (Interfax, 1735 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) The 
treaty, which was signed by Kuchma and Boris Yel'tsin in 1997 and ratified by 
Ukraine in early 1998, recognizes Ukraine's territorial integrity and existing 
borders. After the Duma vote, Kuchma said, "[the ratification] put a full-stop on 
the question of whether Ukraine exists or not." (Holos, 22 Dec 98, pp. 1, 3; FBIS-
SOV 98-364, and ITAR- TASS, 2002 GMT, 29 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-363) 
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But not so fast. The Russian winds seem to have shifted, thanks in large part to 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov apparently considers himself the protector 
of Sevastopol, which he calls a "Russian city." During a visit to the city during 
August 1998, Luzhkov spoke before cheering crowds of ethnic Russians, vowing 
"to keep alive their hope that Sevastopol will be back in Russia one day." (For 
background, see Interfax, 1120 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-238) In the last 
two weeks, Luzhkov has been doing his best to fulfill his vow. 
 
Luzhkov has been railing at Duma Deputies for "betraying Sevastopol," and 
calling on his fellow Federation Council members not to ratify the treaty. (Interfax, 
1427 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-011) The treaty is, in his words, "a forced 
assimilation of Russians." (ITAR-TASS, 1644 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
013) 
 
Without ratification by both houses of parliament, the treaty cannot go into effect. 
It was thought that ratification by the council, or upper house, would simply be a 
formality. The vote on ratification in the council, however, was delayed until 27 
January. Then, on that day, the council voted overwhelmingly to postpone the 
ratification vote again -- this time until at least mid-February. Federation Council 
Chairman Yegor Stroev explained that the council needs time to "carefully study 
all opinions... I think we shall be guided by the opinion of the commission and of 




The reluctance of the Federation Council to ratify the treaty may have also been 
influenced by Ukraine's outright refusal to participate in the "Union of Sovereign 
States," and by the country's continuing refusal to turn away from NATO. 
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After the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty and the "declaration on unification 
of Russia and Belarus" were signed on the same day, Oleg Korolev, the deputy 
chairman of the Federation Council, called the declaration "the beginning of an 
actual revival of the Union of Sovereign States." The Russia- Belarus Union 
Declaration, he said, "dooms" other republics to join. (ITAR- TASS, 2040 GMT, 
25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) At the same time, Russian Duma Speaker 
Gennadi Seleznev claimed that the Friendship Treaty would stop Ukraine from 
cooperating with NATO. "All the rumors that someone is running somewhere -- to 
NATO or any other military bloc -- are [in] vain. Ukraine has been and remains a 
Slavic country, an eternal ally of Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1703 GMT, 29 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-363)  
 
Ukraine, however, wasn't playing those games. The country immediately refused 
to join the "Slavic Union," and announced its intention to continue its current 
course regarding NATO. Russia was denied the rewards it apparently expected. 
 
So, just how irritated at Ukraine are the Federation Council members? Or, just 
how influential is Yuri Luzhkov? Ukraine will once again simply have to wait and 
see -- at least until mid-February, when the Federation Council votes on whether 
Ukraine really exists or not. 
 
Money makes the world go 'round... 
Ukraine's leaders are collectively crossing their fingers, waiting to see if they 
passed the recent IMF reform test. Several IMF representatives left Ukraine on 
26 January without saying whether they would recommend to the IMF board of 
directors that the third tranche of a $2.2 billion Extended Fund Facility loan be 
released. The EEF loan was granted to Ukraine in September 1998, but only 
$336 million was released before funding was halted in November. At that time, 
the IMF said Ukraine had failed to fulfill more than a few of the 141 economic 
reforms required in exchange for the loan. 
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Before the IMF representatives arrived last month, Ukrainian Vice Premier Serhiy 
Tyhypko admitted that most IMF requirements still have not been carried out, but 
noted that the country had now fulfilled 42 of the reforms and was in the process 
of beginning another 18. (ITAR-TASS, 1516 GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-012) 
Perhaps most importantly, the IMF representatives did not rule out a resumption 
of lending, and noted several improvements before departing. A decision on 
whether lending will be resumed will be announced in February. (ITAR-TASS, 
1417 GMT, 19 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) 
 
Meanwhile, the United States announced that it would continue its aid to Ukraine, 
but will only provide $195 million, which is $30 million lower than the amount of 
aid granted last year. (Interfax, 0932 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-013) 
 
Ukraine's FY 1999 debt to foreign creditors already has surpassed $1 billion. 
 
Election `99... here we come! 
At the beginning of the year, Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko announced 
that a parliament coalition had been formed to support President Kuchma in the 
upcoming election, and that "some staff changes" would be forthcoming "in 
response to the... coalition." Those changes have now begun to be detailed. 
 
According to Pustovoytenko, the new coalition includes the centrist People's 
Democratic Party, the more liberal Green Party, and the original centrist Social-
Democratic Party. It also includes factions of the leftist Peasants' Party, and 
nationalist Rukh and Hromada parties. However, given the divisions within the 
parties themselves, the strength of the coalition is questionable.  
 
The fact that any type of coalition has been created at all, however, is a 
remarkable achievement. Just three months ago, most observers were predicting 
the fall of the Pustovoyenko government, and the resurgence of the communists. 
However, the government survived a 13 October 1998 "no-confidence" vote by 
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23 votes, and then began the task of building an anti-leftist coalition, with 
promises of cabinet posts for parties that voted in their favor. (For background, 
see Interfax, 1233 GMT, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Kuchma and Pustovoyenko apparently now believe they've molded the strongest 
coalition possible, and have begun dispersing the promised rewards. There has 
been no more talk from the Communists of removing the current government. 
 
The most important staff changes are as follows (not all information is complete): 
First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Holubchenko was replaced by Vlodimir 
Kuratchenko; Mikailo Hladi (former Lviv governor) was named deputy prime 
minister, agro-industrial complex; Stepan Senchuk was named Lviv governor; 
and Vasyl Rybachuk was named deputy head of the state service directorate. 
(Intelnews, 0047 GMT, 15 Jan 99; nexis, and Intelnews, 0127 GMT, 4 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-004). 
 
So, you want your missile cruiser, eh? 
The Ukrainian Industry Ministry seems to have found itself a $10 million hostage 
-- the newly repaired missile cruiser Moskva. 
 
The Moskva was built in 1976 (under the name Slava) and, according to the 
press service of the Russian Navy, "has a displacement of 12,000 tons and a 
crew of 400." It was sent to Nikolaev, Ukraine for repairs, which were to be 
financed by Russia, and was then scheduled to join the Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol. Now the repairs are complete, except the Russian payment for the 
work never arrived. So, the Ukrainian industry ministry announced that the 
Moskva "will not be handed over to the Black Sea Fleet before Russia pays $10 
million for repairs," and has been holding the ship for several weeks. According 
to the ministry, Russia owes a total of $100 million for Black Sea Fleet-related 
work. There has been no response from either the commander of the Black Sea 
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Fleet or the Russian Navy. (UT-1 Television Network, 0700 GMT, 8 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-008, and ITAR-TASS, 1443 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99- 013) 
 
BELARUS 
Diary of a non-union 
On 25 December 1998, Boris Yel'tsin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka spoke in 
grandiose terms about their "declaration of further unification of Russia and 
Belarus." "This document opens a new page in our relationship. It embodies the 
aspirations of our countries and peoples to come together," Yel'tsin said. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 1233 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) But, does it 
really? Since that glorious declaration, there has been very little unity between 
Belarus and Russia, while the domestic opposition to President Lukashenka has 
been energized. 
 
On 25 December, Interfax explained the "unification plan" step by step, detailing 
what would happen almost immediately in the process. "In February, a special 
agreement should be signed that will regulate prices and tariffs on goods and 
services in transport, communications, energy and gas industries. Also in 
February, the pricing principles of the two countries should be standardized." In 
addition, a plan should be implemented "to secure the mutual convertibility of the 
two currencies. (Interfax, 1318 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) 
 
Soon, however, the backtracking began. Belarusian Finance Minister Mikalay 
Korbut said less than a week after the documents were signed that, before 2000, 
"the two countries will introduce a common clearing currency in one form or 
another." (Belapan, 1245 GMT, 1 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-001) So much for 
February. 
 
On 15 January, President Lukashenka announced the abandonment of "market 
spontaneous principles" for setting consumer prices, a policy that certainly does 
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not meet the unification requirement that "pricing principles of the two countries 
should be standardized." 
 
Meanwhile, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Russia-Belarus Union met in 
Minsk on 21 January to create a task force to work on unification issues. On the 
same day, Russia stopped over 500 Belarusian trucks at the Russian border for 
failing to have the necessary entry permits. Belapan explained, "In accordance 
with the law, only 9,500 permits were issued for Belarusian carriers for 1999, 
although as many as 120,000 would be needed." (Belapan, 1435 GMT, 21 Jan 
99; FBIS-SOV-99-022) After the trucks blocked traffic for a full day, they were 
allowed to cross the border. 
 
Shortly after, the Russian government imposed new export duties on crude oil, 
which will reportedly remain in effect for only six months. As of the end of 
January, no special arrangement had been made for Belarus, although 
consultations were being held with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (ITAR- 
TASS World Service, 1530 GMT, 25 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-025) 
 
As the unification plans began bogging down, Lukashenka appealed to Russia to 
"keep the integration process at its current pace and fulfill its plans," but admitted 
that relations "have somewhat slowed down." (Interfax, 1238 GMT, 12 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-012) 
 
Lukashenka's domestic opposition has been invigorated, however. In a country 
where the people have generally been afraid to protest for fear of police brutality 
and arrest, significant demonstrations against both the union and Lukashenka's 
policies have been held at least six times since 25 December. While the protests 
began on 28 December with just a few dozen people blocking traffic, they have 
increased to include several thousand people at a time. (Interfax, 1514 GMT, 28 
Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-362, and Belapan, 0100 GMT, 23 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
023) All protests, of course, end in dozens of arrests. 
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As the demonstrations have grown, so has the will of the legitimate government 
to continue its shadow operations. The 40 remaining members of the Duma 
elected by the people in 1994, but disbanded in 1996 by President Lukashenka 
in favor of hand-picked members, still hold parliamentary sessions. This month, 
the 13th Supreme Soviet, as they are known, announced that the next 
presidential elections in Belarus would, according to the constitution of 1994, be 
scheduled for 16 May 1999. Lukashenka does not subscribe to the 1994 
constitution, and his prosecutor general said that the scheduling of elections is 
"an attempt to seize power by unconstitutional means, destabilize the society, 
and provoke wide-spread unrest." (Interfax, 1356 GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-
99-012) Meanwhile, the two main opposition parties, the Belarusian People's 
Front and the Belarusian Social Democratic Hromada, have both threatened 
violence over unification. 
 
The opposition has found a cause, thanks to Lukashenka. Clearly, at least at this 
point, the president seems to be on the losing side of this issue. 
 
MOLDOVA 
We're back in the money! 
Just when it seemed that Moldova was on the verge of complete collapse and 
bankruptcy, the country has been pulled out of the abyss by the IMF. The 
country, which has been forced to lay off military personnel, shut down most of 
the state-run media, and ration food and electricity because of a lack of funds, 
has received word that the IMF will shortly resume lending to it. 
 
The head of the IMF mission in the area, Mark Horton, said the country will soon 
receive a tranche of $35 million, and could receive a total of $135 million from the 
IMF this year. Lending had been halted in mid-1997 when the IMF determined 
that Moldova was making no progress on economic reforms. Horton said the 
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resumption of lending came because the main recommendations of the IMF had 
been incorporated into the FY-1999 budget. 
 
Back to the table 
Negotiations between the government of Moldova and representatives of the 
breakaway republic of Dniestr have resumed after months of bickering. Moldovan 
President Petru Lucinschi (in need of some positive news for his administration) 
has been implying to the news media that an agreement may be near on both 
withdrawal of Russian troops and the status of the republic. "You have to bear in 
mind," he said, "that of all the conflicts bequeathed to us by the Soviet Union, this 
particular one is closest to settlement." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1738 GMT, 
15 Jan 99; FBIS-UMA-99-016) Does "nearest to settlement" really mean 
agreement, however? Probably not. The plans proposed by both sides appear 
not to have changed a great deal, and although Russia claimed a month ago that 
the country was in the process of beginning a pullout of troops, it now seems that 




Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Desperately seeking something... 
"If Armenia places Russian military bases on its territory, why cannot Azerbaijan 
place US, Turkish, or NATO military bases on its own territory? " asked State 
Foreign Policy Adviser Vafa Guluzade. "I really think that in the current situation, 
Azerbaijan should bolster military cooperation with the West to ensure its 
security. To start with, it would not be so bad to move the US military base in 
Turkey, at Incirlik, to the Apsheron peninsula [Azerbaijan]." (Turan, 1700 GMT, 
18 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-019) Washington's icy silence and Guluzade's 
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retraction followed swiftly on the heels of this statement. Yet, in the context of 
ever-increasing Russian military presence in Armenia and flagging US interest in 
Azerbaijan, there are plenty of reasons for concern. 
 
...enter GUAM 
The defense ministers from Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan met in Baku on 21 
January to discuss the possibility of military cooperation. (The Moldovan defense 
minister was expected but did not arrive.) They discussed a plan to form a 
peacekeeping battalion that would operate only with the approval of the member 
countries and only on their territory -- therefore, it would not require a UN 
mandate. One of the main duties of the battalion would be the protection of the 
oil pipelines. (Turan, 1630 GMT, 21 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-021) Should such a 
battalion be formed it may to some degree enhance the scrutiny of the four 
member states and make them more desirable partners for the US. 
 
A very porous blockade 
A recent article shows that Azerbaijan's blockade against Armenia has been 
largely ineffective. Using trade statistics for sales of fuels and chemicals to 
Armenia and Georgia, the authors demonstrate that the trade with Georgia has 
increased in the same products and quantities as Armenian imports for 1987, the 
last year before the imposition of the blockade. This indirect evidence is 
corroborated by other more specific reports, that Azeri Afghan veterans and 
Armenian Afghan veterans ran a fuel import-export business during the most 
difficult stage of the war. Since the cease-fire accord of 1994, the trade has 
grown substantially among more legitimate businesses. The high volume of 
exports benefits Azerbaijani producers, who avoid breaking the law by working 
with Georgian middlemen. In view of the difficult economic situation in the 
country, the governmental authorities choose to look the other way. (Zerkalo, 26 
Dec 98, p. 22; FBIS-SOV-99-018) It seems that the only tangible result of the 
Azerbaijani blockade against Armenia is the imposition of punitive sanctions by 
the US Congress against Azerbaijan. 
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Another coup attempt suppressed? 
On the night of 7 January several former military and police officers who were 
serving jail sentences for participating in a failed coup attempt in 1995 reportedly 
tried to break out of prison. According to Ramil Usubov, the interior minister, the 
leaders were Vakhid Musaev, a former deputy defense minister and army 
general, and Faig Bakhshaliev, a former ally of Rovoshan Dzavadov, a police 
commander who died while leading the March 1995 uprising. Musaev, 
Bakhshaliev, nine other inmates, and a guard were killed. (Interfax, 1333 GMT, 
10 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-010) 
 
Usubov claimed that the jail mutiny was sponsored by foreign agents and was 
aimed at the removal of President Aliev, yet he offered no details to corroborate 
that version of events. The one item he shared, that Musaev and Bakhshaliev 
told the others that Aliev had already been deposed, seems illogical. If Aliev had 
been removed, why would they need to mutiny? Surely those who had seized 
power would free them. 
 
The frequency with which the Azerbaijani government uncovers schemes in time 
to eliminate its opponents is truly amazing. Aliev must have the stupidest 
enemies and the very best security personnel. It seems at least equally likely that 
the prisoners were shot in their cells. That is the opinion of Musaev's widow, who 
insists that her husband was not involved in any conspiracy. She also points out 
that all four of his cellmates were killed as well, which would also suggest that 
they were simply murdered. (Turan, 1350 GMT, 9 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-009) 
 
DAGESTAN 
Early warning in border region 
The mayor of Derbent, Nikolai Alchiev, stated in a recent interview that he is not 
concerned by signs of renewed activity by the Lezgin terrorist organization 
Sadval. Alchiev insists that the Dagestani and Azerbaijani politicians who fear 
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that the Sadval congress, which was held in Derbent, may signify the re-
emergence of a violent Lezgin movement for independence are mistaken. 
Although several years ago Sadval armed the Lezgin population on the border 
between Dagestan and Azerbaijan, carried out bombings in the Baku subway, 
and provoked several border confrontations, it may yet transform itself into a 
legitimate political party. Alchiev thinks that new personalities have taken control 
of Sadval and wish to use it as a springboard for the 9 March elections to the 
Dagestani parliament. In his estimation, the local population does not wish to 
provoke a secessionist conflict but it may still regard Sadval as the most 
legitimate voice to represent the Lezgins in the Dagestani parliament. 
 
"It is very hard to find broad support among the population for separatist 
statements," he said. However, that does not mean that there is no necessity to 
find ways of accommodating the legitimate needs of the population, for instance, 
"an organization that would deal with the problems of Lezgins's compact 
habitation on a socioeconomic level." This structure would presumably represent 
the Lezgin community to both governments without challenging the sovereignty 
of either. The most important topic at present is the nature of the border controls 
and tariffs since many Lezgins make their living in cross-border trade. (Zerkalo, 
26 Dec 98, p. 27; FBIS-SOV-99-014) 
 
In the mid-80s the Nagorno-Karabkh leadership complained to the Azerbaijani 
government about the poor maintenance of the road leading to Armenia. At 
roughly the same time the Abkhaz leaders wanted to found a university in their 
region. While many other factors contributed to the escalation of those conflicts 
into wars, the fact that the Azerbaijani and Georgian governments were 
unresponsive to moderate demands certainly did not help their cause. While a 
government can do little to forestall separatist agitation, it may well be able to 





Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Observers disagree sharply over legitimacy of president's electoral victory 
Amid widely differing views on whether the recent presidential elections in 
Kazakhstan were marred by coercive campaign promises and voter fraud, 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev swept to victory with an alleged 81.75 percent 
share of the vote. (Kazakh Radio First Program Network, 0700 GMT, 11 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-011) Voter turnout was also high, with 7,135,275 out of 8,270,217 
eligible voters (86.28 percent) going to the polls. (Kazakh Radio First Program 
Network, 0500 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-011). The remaining three 
candidates -- Gani Kasymov, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, and Engels Gabbasov -- 
received 4.72 percent, 12.8 percent, and 0.78 percent of the vote, respectively. 
(Kazakh Radio First Program Network, 0700 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
011) 
 
However, at a press conference on 12 January, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the Kazakh 
Communist Party's presidential candidate, accused the electoral commission of 
falsifying the election results by drastically inflating the figures for total voter 
turnout and by submitting false ballot counts for the various voting districts. 
Abdildin alleged that several of his party's observers had seen electoral officials 
at the polls hand ballots to voters which had already been filled out, and that in 
most voting districts, the members of the electoral commission did not even 
bother to count the actual ballots, but simply broadcast figures given to them by 
the authorities. The Kazakh Communist Party further claimed that, according to 
the real election results, he had won the largest share of the votes. However, he 
added, his party would not attempt to challenge the election results in a court of 
law, but would instead demand that new elections be held in 2000. (Interfax, 
1157 GMT, 12 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-012) 
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Whether or not all of Abdildin's allegations are true, Gani Kasymov's campaign 
managers also claimed to have witnessed incidents of voter fraud at Polling 
Station No. 18 in Almaty, where many voters apparently turned in more than one 
ballot. (NTV, 1100 GMT, 10 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-010) The OSCE voiced grave 
doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the elections as well. Coordinators of 
the OSCE's Kazakh mission, Judy Thompson and Vladimir Shkolnikov, told a 
press conference on 11 January that their organization did not recognize the 
validity of Kazakhstan's recent elections, based on the fact that the elections had 
not been in compliance with the OSCE's membership principles. Thompson 
stated that one of the most serious violations of these principles was the 
amendment to Kazakhstan's election law which prohibits anyone who has been 
criminally charged from running for political office for one year. Aqezhan 
Qazhegeldyn was barred from the presidential elections on the basis of this law. 
(Interfax, 1246 GMT, 11 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-011) 
 
International election observers from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Turkey, and 
England reported no irregular voting practices whatsoever. One observer from 
the British parliament called the Kazakh elections "well-organized" and a Turkish 
parliament member stated that the elections had been democratic. (Interfax, 




Regardless of whether the published ballot results for Kazakhstan's presidential 
elections reflect the truth, there does appear to be plenty of evidence that 
President Nazarbaev's campaign managers engaged in illegal practices in order 
to obtain enough signatures for his registration as a candidate with the electoral 
commission. According to an article in Komsomol'skaya pravda, many people 
were threatened with loss of their jobs or expulsion from their places of study if 
they did not sign registration petitions in support of the incumbent president. In 
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other instances, families were threatened with having their electricity and/or 
telephone service cut off unless they supported the president in the upcoming 
elections. The opposition candidates and their campaign workers were also 
subjected to considerable harassment. A number of Serikbolsyn Abdildin's 
campaign assistants in Astana were forced to stop working for the Communist 
Party candidate after their children were threatened with expulsion from school. 
(Komsomol'skaya pravda, 6-15 Jan 99, p. 10; FBIS-SOV-99-007) 
 
Evidence such as this, along with the fact that scheduling early elections on such 
short notice gave the opposition little time to organize a real campaign, seriously 
undermines the election results. The barring of not only Aqezhan Qazhegeldyn, 
but also other prominent opposition figures (e.g., Petr Svoik of Azamat), from 
standing in the elections ensured that President Nazarbaev would face little real 
competition. Thus, even without the allegations of voter fraud and ballot count 
falsification, it is difficult to perceive Kazakhstan's 1999 presidential elections as 
more than a rather spurious means of ensuring President Nazarbaev's reign for 
another seven years. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
  
External funding focuses on education and joint projects 
The Baltic states will continue to receive substantial support in 1999 for military 
projects from foreign countries. The US is set to provide $3.4 million worth of 
surveillance equipment for a Baltnet station west of Tallinn. Norway will provide 
communication equipment to the surveillance project. Support for military 
education and training is also due to arrive from Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. 





Attention brought to defense spending, command structure 
Demonstrating an awareness of the need to increase military-related spending, 
Estonia has earmarked 949 million kroon (EEK), the equivalent of US$71.46 
million, for the defense ministry budget in 1999. Of that total, EEK87.7 million is 
dedicated to joint military defense projects with the other Baltic states, 
participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and military attaches. 
(Baltic News Service, 1626 GMT, 4 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-004). This could result 
in a critically needed rise in preparedness for both professional military and 
reservists. Currently, in the case of attack, Estonia can arm 53 percent of its male 
population listed as reservists, according to a defense ministry spokesman. 
(BNS, 1624 GMT, 5 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-005) 
 
Money alone will not guarantee a well-run military machine, however. According 
to Andrus Oovel, Estonia's outgoing defense minister, the armed forces 
commander has too much free rein with virtually no civilian oversight. The current 
defense management system, Oovel said, "makes it possible for the defense 
forces commander to interpret laws, government decrees, the prime minister's 
resolutions, and of course the defense minister's orders ... to his best 
advantage." (BNS Daily Report, 1100 GMT, 6 Jan 99) Oovel's solution: 
subordinate the armed forces commander to the defense ministry. 
 
LATVIA 
Latvia raises defense budget, names new armed forces commander 
Latvia, too, is increasing its defense budget allocation, as promised. President 
Guntis Ulmanis expressed his satisfaction with the Cabinet of Minister's 
commitment to increase the country's defense budget allocation to 1 percent of 
GDP. (BNS, 1801 GMT, 6 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-006) In talks with NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana last summer, government officials had outlined 
their plan to increase defense spending from .67 to 1 percent of GDP in 1999 
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and gradually to 2 percent of GDP in five years' time. (Baltic News Service Daily 
Report, 1600 GMT, 18 Jun 98) NATO member states in 1997 had defense 
budgets averaging 2.8 percent of GDP. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 
GMT, 16 Jun 98) 
 
In addition to money matters, the government also took some much-needed care 
of personnel business. The turmoil over the position of armed forces commander, 
begun when a misappropriation of funds scandal brought about the resignation of 
Juris Eihmanis last fall, has finally ended with the appointment of Raimonds 
Graube. Graube, a lieutenant colonel of the Home Guard who had been serving 
as acting commander since Eihmanis' removal, won the support of the Saeima's 
Defense and Internal Affairs Commission in mid-January. (Radio Riga Network, 
1300 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-013) 
 
False interview charges bring about spokesman's resignation 
Latvian Way spokesman and Respublika correspondent Mikhail Mamilov, who 
published a falsified interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on 11 
January (Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 13 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-013), was 
removed from his party post. After NATO announced that Solana had never 
granted an interview to Respublika or Mamilov, Mamilov explained the article 
was "a literary-processed version" of a news conference Solana gave in Latvia 
last summer. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1700 GMT, 18 Jan 99) Party 
chairman Andrejs Pantelejevs cited Mamilov's primary identification with Latvia's 
Way, rather than as a Respublika reporter, as reason for the dismissal. (Baltic 
News Service Daily Report, 1100 GMT, 14 Jan 99) 
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